Three major criticisms have been leveled at the institution of the corporate board of directors.
The most frequently made criticism of the corporate board of directors is that it is ceremonial, rubberstamping the views of management. One retired board chairman of a successful company describes the board of directors as the "Achilles heel of the American corporation." A leading scholar refers to the corporate board as an "impotent legal fiction." This belief comes from many sources. In Business Leadership in the Large Corporation, his 1948 classic study of large companies, R. A. Gordon concluded that directors are closer to top management than to the stockholders and that ratification of management proposals by the board is largely a formality. He also reported that, as a result of its control of the proxy machinery, management more often selects directors than vice versa. Robert H. Malott, an experienced corporate director and retired chief executive officer (CEO), identifies the biggest barrier to effective outside directorship as the old boy network that dominates some boards. This makes it personally unpleasant for directors to question the performance of their peers "and often their friends."
A second, closely related criticism is that the board's deliberations are dominated by the CEO, who typically also serves as chairman. When the same person controls the agenda and conduct of boardroom proceedings as well as the day-to-day performance of the company, the power of the individual director may indeed become attenuated. Despite the rising number of outside directors and special committees of corporate boards, in most eases the center of power remains with the management. CEOs serve as chairman of the board in 80 percent of the larger corporations.
Management consultants report that many directors act as part of top management rather than as monitors able and willing to reward and penalize management's performance. A longtime board member states that the ambiguity of the role of the corporate board begins with the prevailing combination of management leadership and board leadership in the same person.
And last, the board is plagued with conflicts of interest. Corporate directors often are criticized for conflicts of interest and for showing greater concern for the welfare of other companies. Many outside directors of corporations do business with the companies on whose board they serve. The literature contains a number of cases of apparent wrongdoing on the part of outside directors who were also officers of companies that supplied services to the corporation or who benefited unfairly from company operations.
An analysis of 286 banks that failed in 1990 and 1991 revealed that in 74 eases the main cause of the failure was fraud and other abuses by directors and officers, such as receiving loans at very low rates. In 101 other instances, insider abuses contributed to the bank's insolvency.
In the case of the Penn Central, a staff report of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the U.S. House of Representatives censured the company's board members for their excessive involvement in other corporate boards. The committee staff noted the subservience of many of the outside directors to the interests of the financial institutions of which they were officers. As the makeup of corporate boards shift to containing a larger percentage of outside directors, the likelihood of such corporate "interlocks" could increase.
In the ease of the larger firms, a problem is emerging in the form of opportunity for back-scratching when setting management compensation. The board's compensation committee is typically a group dominated by outside directors. What is wrong with that? Frequently, those outside directors are senior officers of other f'mns and are very sympathetic to motions for generous treatment of their counterparts. Aside from the intrinsic merits of the matter, their self-interest dietates such a stand. After all, the compensation committees of their own boards are often similarly composed of CEOs of peer firms. Moreover, the management consultants advising those committees take full account of such peer-group action by the other boards. The ratchet effect that results is quite obvious.
Other nominally independent outside directors may in practice represent another set of special interests--those of the local community. Senior officers of local firms that primarily sell goods and services to the surrounding area may see great value in the company donating lavishly to local causes, even if its markets are national or international. Another serious concern is the relationship of the inside directors to the ehairman/CEO. After all, he is their day-to-day supervisor, usually with the effective authority to radically change the directors' role in the company and even to fu'e or demote them. It is rare to see a subordinate officer serving on a board dissent from the position taken by the CEO.
The Push for Reform
Criticisms of the board have led to a variety of proposals to reform corporate governance.
Over the years, Ralph Nader and his colleagues have developed numerous ambitious and far-reaching proposals to restructure the corporation. To give "all stockholders in corporate decision-making a real voice in corporate governance," Nader advocates a Corporate Democracy Act. Under this proposal, the federal government would assume the chartering power now residing in the individual states. Nader wants to install full-time outside directors who would take an active role in the governance of the corporation.
It is interesting to note that the charter of the Equitable Life Insurance Company requires the Chief Justice of New Jersey to appoint several outside directors. Over the years, these appointees have included female civic leaders and physicians, who are far from typical
